Binding: Paperback Dewey Decimal Number: 940.4147 EAN: 9780340573488 ISBN: 0340573481 Label: A Hodder Arnold Publication Manufacturer: A Hodder Arnold Publication Number Of Items: 1 Number Of Pages: 512 Publication Date: 1996-11-29 Publisher: A Hodder Arnold Publication Studio: A Hodder Arnold Publication
This book draws on ten years of archival research to provide the first comprehensive treatment in English of how Germany and Austria-Hungary conducted World War I and what defeat meant to them.
Spotlight customer reviews:
Customer Rating: Summary: First Clear Overview of the War I Have Read Comment: I strongly recommend this book for someone who wants a clear overview of the First World War. I have read other books and I have never really gotten a good idea of how the strategy of the war was decided upon until this book came along. Usually, they give a description of the Schlieffen plan and how it was undone at the Marne, but then the rest of the war is presented as two monster forces flailing away at each other ineffectually emphasizing the futility of events like the "madness and misery" of Verdun or Passchendaele, the supposed incompetance of the British High Command, or the mutiny of the French Army in 1917. It is true this book's emphasis is on the Central Powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary, but this is the key to understanding the strategy of the war, since the initiative was usually in their hands (the war with the Ottoman Turks is ignored in this book). The author points out that so many American and British historians, while dwelling on the flaws and defects of the Allies and the supposed "efficiency" of the Germans leave the reader wondering why in the end the Germans lost and the Allies won.
The author gives a good explanation of why there was such a serious food shortage in the Central Powers which played such an important role in bringing about their collapse, the inefficiency and outright stupidity of the Hindenburg-Ludendorff military dictatorship that got total control of Germany in the wake of the joint 1916 Verdun-Somme disasters (yes, in spite of the losses, the French and British inflicted a major setback on the Germans in those engagements, something that I didn't perceive so clearly in other accounts of the War), Ludendorff's bungling direction of the final big Kaiserschlacht offensive in 1918 and special emphasis on the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian war effort that greatly weakened their German allies as well. Interestingly enough, the author attributes well-meaning Austrian Emperor Karl's liberal reforms as contributing to the disintegration of the Empire and its military force.
One important conclusion that the author brings at the very end of the book and which deserved more elaboration than he gives is that the German military reached the conclusion in the wake of their defeat that the Hindenburg-Ludendorff military dictatorship wasted too much effort in dealing with domestic problems such as collective bargaining with the powerful labor unions and other civilian problems, so that in the next war, it would be better for there to be a "strong man" who would crack the whip on the population to keep them in line and producing the weapons that would be needed. This leader would, in turn, let the "military experts" run the war, which is what they were really trained for. In the end, the military got this "strong leader", but they ultimately got more than they bargained for when this "strong leader" turned on them and destroyed the Prussian/Germany military clique once and for all. Customer Rating: Summary: The Other Guys Comment: Holger Herwig, a professor of history at the University of Calgary has put together an important and innovate book on the "other guys" in World War I. Americans are, of course, more interested in World War II than the war that proceeded, but when they do direct their attention to the 1910s, they tend to look at it through a British lens. The western front gets more attention than any other theater, and the focus tends to be on the actions of the English-speaking armies, even if they aren't American.
As a result, this book is particularly valuable to those of us that do not read German. It offers a solid account of what the enemy was doing and why. First, this is book is about the two German-speaking Empires that fought the Entente Powers. Except for specialized accounts that focus on the Dual Monarchy itself, the Austro-Hungarian Empire is largely absent from accounts about the fighting of this conflict. Herwig's book is also important because he offers a new view on the origins of the conflict. He shows that both empires feel they need the other. Germany went to war not out of a sense that they were destined to rule the planet, but out of a realization that a war was inevitable and that they needed to strike while strike while the Hapsburg Empire was able and willing to contribute to the effort.
The Austro-Hungarian Empire made a game effort. Herwig's coverage of the eastern front is rare and exceptionally valuable. After the first twelve months of the conflict, the Dual monarch had shattered itself and became a liability, needing German assistance just to keep going, but refusing to accept that they were no longer a major power.
Herwig is offering his readers a military history, but it is broad in focus. He looks at war time mobilization of these two empires and argues that neither managed their resources well. At the end of the war, their armies were far less technologically advanced than those of their enemies. Herwig choose to focus his account on the political, diplomatic, and strategic levels of this conflict. We find that the Central Powers were quite bad at strategy and blundered time and time again. Herwig never really goes into tactical level issues, which is understandable, given his focus. Nor does he spend much time on naval operations, which is surprising given his previous work in this field. Air power is another topic that gets little attention. A greater discussion of these two topics probably would only have underscored his arguments more and the relatively little attention he gives two air and sea are not real problems with this work.
The prose is engaging and this book is highly recommend for anyone interested in the topic.
Customer Rating: Summary: Good information but weak in style points Comment: One of the strengths of a historical review is the way in which information is presented. Professor Herwig has a bad habit of ending his sentances with exclamation points to make some tidbit seems more impressive. I would think that if he was reading a paper by one of his students, he would get tired of seeing so much of the narrative emphasissed. His editor should have been the one to excise this problem but didn't, but if he did then I would hate to see what the original manuscript looked like.
In some places, the writing reminds me of an overexcited lecturer who has large quantities of information to get through that he inadvertantly jumps around from place to place. There are times when reading the books that it is hard to tell what year he is referring to because he digresses back to some anecdote but doesn't tell the reader when it happened.
Informationally, the sections on the Austro-Hungarian army is the most impressive. Much of what is presented is from the archives of the Dual Monarchy and is interesting on it's own. The discussion of how little by little the German General Staff took over control of the war, helps to explain how the disintergration of the Dual Monarchy had become a 'fait accompli' by 1917.
So four stars for information, minus one star for presentation. Customer Rating: Summary: An Informative Read Comment: The First World War by Holger Harwig was about the roles of Germany and Austria-Hungary during World War I. While this book was presented in chronological order, there were three major topics that stretched throughout the book. Harwig presented a traditional military history of the Great War. Harwig also examined Germany's and Austria-Hungary's economy and society during the War. The final topic, which I found the most interesting, dealt with the often-strained relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary. This review will cover all three topics separately. The First World War also touched upon some other aspects of the war including an examination of its causes and how Adolf Hitler was able to use the theory that Germany was "stabbed in the back" in 1918 as propaganda to gain power.
I found the major campaigns to presented in a good but unexceptional manner. Harwig wrote about the major campaigns in France, Italy, the Balkans, and on the Eastern Front. The author provided concise descriptions of the strategies (mostly from the Austro-German perspective), the events, and the outcomes of those campaigns. There were also statistics of the numbers of casualties suffered on both sides. This is adequate information to inform the casual reader about the major campaigns of World War I, but I would have preferred reading something more specialized that examined at least some of the battles in better detail. I personally would have preferred if at least one of the assigned textbooks was a case study of one campaign that went into far greater depth than either the reading or what was being presented in class.
I was also unimpressed with the maps, which were both poorly placed and too general. Many of the maps can be found several pages into the author's summary of a particular campaign, rather than at the beginning (and there is no mention in the text as to where the map is). For example, the events of Operation Michael begin on p. 400, and the map is on p. 404. When I began reading about the events of this operation, I had no idea where the map would be (or even if there would be a map). Many of these maps, such as the one just mentioned, are too general and not specific enough to cover smaller areas of the battle. I would have preferred separate maps showing each of the six major offensives that Erich Ludendorff launched in Spring 1918.
I was much more impressed with how Herwig covered the homefront. While I am no dietician, I was able to appreciate the changes in the amount of food that the soldiers and civilians were consuming as the war progressed. By the end of the war, the average Austrian soldier was eating only 1 ? ounces of meat per day and weighed approximately 120 pounds, and the German soldiers were only slightly better off. Civilians received even less food than the soldiers. This helped me appreciate why so many German soldiers wasted apparently valuable time looting Allied stores in the Spring 1918 (the Confederate soldiers did the same thing during the Civil War). It also helped me to understand why Paul actually brought food home to his family in All Quiet on the Western Front. I could not help but think of the Napoleonic maxim that an army travels on its stomach.
Being cut off from the world market, the Central Powers were deprived of many raw materials that were necessary for the war effort. Some of them included rubber, various metals, and petroleum. Germany and Austria-Hungary were able make due in several different ways. They succeeded in plundering enough oil and grain from Romania to help keep them in the war until 1918. Holger wrote about how German industrialists were able to create synthetic materials, such as nylon, in a desperate attempt at improvising. Finally, Germany was forced to revert to a command economy, with strict rationing of all raw materials. Naturally, there was a black market in both Germany and Austria-Hungary for luxury goods; Herwig wrote about how Sigmund Freud resorted to the black market to purchase his cigars.
Germany and Austria-Hungary also had to play a careful game in terms of the labor supply. The author wrote about how the Central Powers had to juggle the number of men who would be serving at the front, in the factories, and on the farms. Sometimes, men would be transferred from one occupation to another when they were needed.
In 1917, the duumvirate of Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff became the virtual dictators of Germany. They forced a command economy to regulate the distribution of raw materials, production of goods, and allocation of labor/soldiers. Herwig believed that they Central Powers did not accomplish as much as they could with what little that they had.
The most interesting aspect of the book was the relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary. While Falkenhayn touched upon it in his memoirs, Herwig wrote about the strained relations between the two most important Central Powers in great detail. In theory, they started the war as equals, but that changed by 1915. After the first year of the war, Austria-Hungary became increasingly dependant upon Germany during the major campaigns in the East. German soldiers also propped up the Austro-Hungarians in Italy. According to Herwig, the Austro-Hungarians lost any ability to continue the war without German support after the Brusilov Offensive of 1916.
The author stressed that the two powers did not always cooperate. Both sides lied to each other about their plans in Russia in 1914. The Austro-Hungarians waged an ill-fated offensive into Italy in 1916 despite Falkenhayn's warnings. The best example of their lack of cooperation was when Emperor Karl of Austria-Hungary actually proposed that Germany cede Alsace-Lorraine to France in the ill-fated Sixtus Affair. Herwig also wrote about the strain between these two allies in regards to who would get supplies (especially food) from Romania and Russia.
The Habsburg Empire also had to play a careful balancing act between its myriad of nationalities. Some, such as the Czechs, were reluctant to fight the Russians, and many deserted. There was also a great deal of mutual antagonism between those national groups. Many groups in the Hungarian section of the Empire resented the high handed nature of their Magyar overlords. According to Herwig, the Hungarians resented having to turn over some of their food to the Austrian part of the Empire.
The relationship that Herwig portrayed between Germany and Austria-Hungary paralleled that of Great Britain and the Thirteen Colonies in the French and Indian War (1754-1760 in North America). The dominant power (Germany) looked down on the other power as being weak and petty in its self interests; consider the quote: "We are allied to a corpse." On the other hand, the weaker power (Austria-Hungary) resented being taken for granted and bossed around by Germany. In 1918, Ludendorff even proposed that Germany should invade Austria-Hungary if relations continued to deteriorate.
The First World War was a good read. I liked Herwig's writing style, and it flowed well. I did not care for the military history part of the book because I was looking for something that went into greater depth. There was much to learn in the sections on the economies and diplomatic relations between Austria-Hungary and Germany. I look forward to reading more books by Holger Herwig.
Customer Rating: Summary: Shakey Alliance Comment: The focus of Holger Herwig's book is from the perspective of Germany and its principle ally, Austria-Hungary. Herwig implicitly argues Germany/Austria-Hungary lost the war because of incompetent generalship, and mismanagement of inadequate resources needed to wage war on a massive scale. Specifically, Herwig blames the failure on the Dual-Monarchy, its unwillingness to subordinate and cooperate in conjunction with its more powerful ally, Germany. Herwig downplays the myth of German military might and attempts to demonstrate that not even Germany, who had showed such greatness as a military power in the latter half of the 19th Century was ready for 20th Century style warfare. Herwig utilizes a chronological method and highly readable narrative style throughout. Generally, Herwig incorporates the standard top-down military/ diplomatic history approach describing causes of the war, mobilization, battles and leaders, major campaigns and results of the war. To a lesser degree, Herwig takes a look at the affects of war on society with such themes as hunger, disease, labor on the home front and gender issues. Overall, Herwig builds his argument by consulting archival sources previously waved over by the "Anglo-centric preoccupations of English language historians" (Strachan, quoted in Herwig, p. xiii). The author admits that a substantial amount of evidence dealing with the Great War was destroyed during bombing raids in WWII. He points out, however, that the reunification of Germany in 1989 has made available documents never before considered by western historians. Herwig relys heavily upon official histories of the war, mainly, Reichsarchiv's Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918, state papers focusing on other German states besides Prussia, and the official history of the Austrian-Hungarian Army. This source material is gleaned from many world famous archival institutions such as: Bundesarchiv (Koblenz), Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (Freiburg), and Vienna's Haus-, Hof- und Staataarchiv, Politisches Archiv and Österreichisches Staatsarchiv. The author also utilizes diaries and memoirs; dissertations and scholarly articles; and secondary sources assembled in perhaps one of the most impressive bibliographies in recent military literature. Although highly readable, the author tends to be too general at times. For example, the Germans advanced through Belgium in a few sentences without any mention of the Belgium resistance or the Germany atrocities committed there in reprisal. One may notice that not once did he mention the scholarship of the historian Barbara Tuchman. In describing campaigns and battles, In contrast to John Keegan's _First World War_, Herwig focuses too much on the top echelons and rarely gets below corps level when recounting troop movements and engagements. Intermittently, Herwig fails to cite sources, particularly when quoting statistics, casualty figures, and troop strength (there are examples where he does quote statistical evidence though). Unlike Martin Gilbert's _First World War_ Herwig succeeds in illustrating the role of Austria-Hungary to great affect. The social/economic aspects of the war are handled adequately without diminishing the 'old style' military history narrative. The book's readability is one of its greatest strengths. Even a one-volume history of The First World War can be daunting, however Herwig captures and holds the reader's attention. On the whole, this work is a valuable addition to WWI literature.
